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INTRODUCTION 
“I plead the Fifth.” It is a phrase so ubiquitous in American popular 
culture that even courts credit “shows like ‘Law & Order’ [and] movies 
such as ‘Guys and Dolls,’” with creating a “culture . . . that knows a 
person in custody has ‘the right to remain silent.’”1 The Supreme Court 
itself has acknowledged that “in popular parlance and even in legal 
literature, the term ‘Fifth Amendment’ . . . is commonly regarded as 
being synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination.”2 
Despite Americans’ seeming familiarity with the Amendment’s 
protections, the exact parameters of its privilege against self-
incrimination remain undefined for America’s criminally accused. 
While it is well-settled that statements violating the Fifth Amendment’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause are inadmissible at trial, this has not stopped 
prosecutors from using such statements in pretrial proceedings to 
establish probable cause for trial or to set the terms of a defendant’s 
bail. These pretrial proceedings are critical for two reasons: first, they 
play a role in the defendant’s trial decisions and strategies, and second, 
they may persuade a defendant to take a plea. Most critically, pretrial 
proceedings can also result in the accused’s loss of liberty. 
The Seventh Circuit recently examined a case in which a statement 
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment was used against a 
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 1. Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 2. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955). 
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woman in pretrial proceedings. On January 13, 2000, three police 
officers took Teresa Sornberger to the police station for questioning 
because they suspected that her husband, Scott, had robbed a local 
bank.3 Frustrated by Teresa’s earlier interview, in which she had 
provided an alibi for her husband, the officers ensured that this 
interview would proceed differently.4 The officers falsely informed 
Teresa that witnesses placed her at the scene of the robbery and falsely 
promised her that, if she implicated her husband, she would not be 
charged with any crime.5 The officers also repeatedly told Teresa to 
think about her children and made threats to take away her children by 
calling the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”).6 
After repeated threats to call DCFS if she continued to maintain 
her husband’s innocence, Teresa verbally confessed that she had 
assisted her husband in the bank robbery.7 Following this oral 
confession, the officers gave Teresa the required Miranda warnings and 
asked her to repeat her oral confession to the police stenographer.8 
When Teresa resisted repeating the statement, the officers again 
reminded her to think of her children and reiterated their threat to call 
DCFS.9 Teresa reluctantly complied, gave her statement to the 
stenographer, and signed the statement.10 This statement, which was 
unwarned and coerced and therefore would be inadmissible at trial, 
was then used in three separate pretrial proceedings.11 The prosecution 
used Teresa’s unwarned statements to support a determination of 
probable cause in a preliminary hearing, which allowed the case to 
proceed to trial.12 These statements were also used at arraignment 
proceedings, when Teresa was called upon to enter a pretrial plea.13 But 
perhaps most damaging, Teresa’s coerced, false confession was used at 
her bail hearing, and bail was set at an amount Teresa was unable to 
 
 3. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 4. Id. at 1012. 
 5. Id. at 1011. 
 6. Id. at 1012. 
 7. Id. at 1011. 
 8. Id. at 1012. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. See id. at 1027 (noting that “failure to administer Teresa Miranda warnings led to three 
distinct ‘courtroom uses’ of her un-warned statements”); see also id. at 1023 n.16 (acknowledging 
that the facts in the record could support a finding that the statement was coerced, as “[t]hreats 
to a suspect’s family or children, even if implicit, certainly may render confessions involuntary for 
purposes of due process”). 
 12. Id. at 1026. 
 13. Id. 
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make.14 As a result of these three proceedings, Teresa Sornberger spent 
four months in jail awaiting trial before the true bank robber 
confessed.15 Teresa lost her liberty for four months, primarily based on 
evidence that would have been inadmissible at trial. 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found that Teresa’s criminal 
prosecution was initiated because of her coerced confession, violating 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.16 The court 
determined that the use of Teresa’s confession at a probable cause 
hearing, bail hearing, and arraignment hearing violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s proscription against compelling a criminal defendant 
“to be a witness against [her]self.”17 
Not all circuits agree with the Seventh Circuit that use of such 
statements at pretrial hearings are a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
It is well-established that the Self-Incrimination Clause means that a 
person cannot be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself,” and that using a statement that is “testimonial, 
incriminating, and compelled,” is a violation of the clause.18 But the 
circuits are fractured over the meaning of “criminal case” within the 
Fifth Amendment. There are differing interpretations over the precise 
moment that a “criminal case” begins, and therefore, what proceedings 
are covered by a person’s right against self-incrimination. The Supreme 
Court offered some guidance on this matter in Chavez v. Martinez.19 
Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality, noted that “[s]tatements 
compelled by police interrogations of course may not be used against a 
defendant at trial . . . but it is not until their use in a criminal case that 
a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”20 Justice Thomas 
refused to articulate when a criminal case begins, but conceded that a 
“‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the initiation of legal 
proceedings, and police questioning does not constitute such a case.”21 
In the absence of more specific definition from the Supreme Court, 
circuits have splintered over when a criminal case begins and therefore 
have also disagreed as to the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination. The Third, Fourth and Fifth 
 
 14. Id. at 1012. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 1027. 
 18. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). 
 19. 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 767. 
 21. Id. 
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Circuits have held that the Self-Incrimination Clause is only a “trial 
right,” meaning that its protections do not extent to pretrial 
proceedings.22 But the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have 
adopted an interpretation of “criminal case” that includes pretrial 
proceedings, shielding defendants like Teresa Sornberger from acting 
as witnesses against themselves throughout the criminal process.23 
This Note argues that a “criminal case,” as provided by the Fifth 
Amendment, begins with the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings, whether that commencement occurs through a formal 
charge, a preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.24 A broad understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s scope 
aligns with the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ analysis. In 
particular, this Note endorses the in-depth analysis provided by the 
Tenth Circuit in its determination that a “criminal case” under the Fifth 
Amendment includes preliminary proceedings. This Note further offers 
an analysis of past Supreme Court precedent as well as policy rationales 
that support a more liberal understanding of “criminal case.” 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, our justice system is “for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”25 As part of the 
system of pleas, “the most critical period of the proceedings against 
these defendants . . . [is] from the time of their arraignment until the 
beginning of their trial.”26 Given that close to 98% of federal 
defendants opt to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial,27 it is 
difficult to overstate the importance of the pretrial period. Limiting the 
application of the Self-Incrimination Clause to trials denies this right 
to almost all charged with a crime. 
Part One of this Note provides a brief overview of the types of 
proceedings conducted before trial, and the impact these proceedings 
can have in shaping the way a trial unfolds. Part Two addresses the 
 
 22. Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285 
(5th Cir. 2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 23. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2017); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 
F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007); Sornberger 
v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–1027 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 24. This Note is limited to a discussion of the federal pretrial processes. 
 25. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
 27. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, Fiscal Year 2018 Overview of Federal Criminal 
Cases, at 8 (June 2019) [hereinafter Fiscal Year 2018 Overview]; see also DEP’T OF JUST., Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2010, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter 
Dep’t of Justice Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics]. 
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circuit split over the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause, beginning 
with an examination of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chavez v. 
Martinez, and then examining the circuits’ interpretation of its holding. 
Part Three provides an in-depth examination of the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis that the Self-Incrimination Clause should be applied to pretrial 
proceedings. 
Part Four provides arguments that have not been previously made 
about why a “criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment should 
include pretrial proceedings. This Part posits that a broad 
understanding of a “criminal case” is consistent with the Court’s other 
applications of the Self-Incrimination Clause and previous Court 
declarations that preliminary hearings are part of a criminal case. This 
Note contends that understanding the criminal case as commencing at 
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings not only aligns 
with Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez, but is also consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent about the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel. 
Finally, Part Five of this Note offers the public policy rationale for 
extending the right to pretrial proceeding so that the right is afforded 
to all those who begin criminal proceedings, not just the 2.5% of cases 
that go to trial.28 It also explores the policy counter-arguments that have 
been raised by those who believe that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
should be limited to only trial proceedings. 
I. PRETRIAL PROCEDURES: AN OVERVIEW 
In a federal criminal case, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(the “Rules”) govern pretrial procedures.29 These mandatory pretrial 
proceedings are the defendant’s initial foray into the courtroom 
following an arrest or formal charge in a criminal case.30 While the exact 
process may differ based on the needs of an individual case, the types 
of proceedings and their requirements are the same.31 This section 
provides an overview of the different pretrial proceedings and the way 
that pretrial processes can affect what happens at trial. 
 
 28. See Fiscal Year 2018 Overview, supra note 27.  
 29. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a) (noting that the rules “govern the procedure in all criminal 
proceedings” in the federal courts).  
 30. Pretrial Hearings, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 286, 286 (2018). 
 31. Id. 
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A. Types and Purposes of Pretrial Proceedings 
Following arrest, a federal criminal defendant has several possible 
opportunities—both mandatory and optional—to appear before the 
court before trial commences.32 Each proceeding safeguards the 
accused’s constitutional rights, beginning with the Gerstein hearing.33 A 
Gerstein hearing, a mandatory proceeding held within 48 hours of a 
warrantless arrest, reviews the police determination that there was 
probable cause to make the arrest and determines whether there is 
probable cause to detain the arrestee pending further proceedings.34 
Gerstein hearings may be held in conjunction with “initial 
appearances,” a proceeding mandated by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.35 The two proceedings may also occur 
independently of each other.36 In an initial appearance, the arresting 
officer is required to bring the accused before a magistrate judge 
“without delay.”37 During the initial appearance, the defendant hears 
the charges against him in open court and is advised of his rights; 
arrangements are also made for him to have a lawyer (either his own 
or a public defender).38 The defendant may also enter a plea at this 
time.39 Bail hearings, sometimes referred to as detention hearings, may 
occur at this initial appearance, or as an entirely separate hearing at a 
later date.40 The judge uses this hearing to determine the bail amount 
or whether the accused is released pending trial.41 If the accused cannot 
meet the bail amount, he is remanded to the custody of the U.S. 
Marshals pending trial.42 
While Gerstein hearings are held to establish probable cause for an 
arrest, other pretrial proceedings are used to establish the existence of 
probable cause for trial; namely, preliminary hearings and grand juries. 
Rule 5.1(a) provides the defendant with a preliminary hearing, also 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 34. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 286–87, 289.  
 35. Id. at 286.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 289. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(d) governs the “initial appearance” 
proceedings for a felony offense, and Rule 58(b)(2) establishes the procedure for initial 
appearances in misdemeanor and petty offense cases. 
 38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10; see also Offices of the United States Attorneys, Initial Hearing / 
Arraignment, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/initial-hearing (last 
accessed Feb. 2, 2020). 
 39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(3); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.  
 40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(3). 
 41. Initial Hearing / Arraignment, supra note 3838. 
 42. Id. 
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known as a preliminary examination or probable cause hearing.43 No 
matter the name, the purpose of this hearing is to demonstrate to the 
judge’s satisfaction that there is sufficient evidence for the case to 
proceed to trial.44 The hearing occurs within either 14 days of arrest if 
the defendant is in custody, or 21 days if the defendant is not in 
custody.45 This hearing is not required if the defendant waives his right 
to the proceeding or if the prosecutor secures an indictment from a 
grand jury.46 
Securing an indictment from a grand jury is another proceeding 
used to establish the existence of probable cause.47 In a grand jury 
proceeding, a prosecutor presents the evidence gathered in the case to 
a group of 16 to 23 jurors;48 at least 12 members of the grand jury must 
believe there is a showing of cause for the government to obtain an 
indictment.49 An indictment satisfies the general requirement that there 
is probable cause for trial;50 if there is no indictment, and no probable 
cause found at a preliminary hearing, the case will be dismissed and the 
defendant will not be forced to stand trial.51 The Rules and pretrial 
proceedings are meant to ensure due process, and serve to guarantee 
that a citizen’s constitutional rights are not violated.52 
 
 43. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 291–92. Although initial appearances and preliminary 
hearings may occur at the same time, this is rare because it does not provide counsel with adequate 
time to prepare for the preliminary hearing. Id. at 286. 
 44. Id. at 291. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). This is required if a defendant is charged with 
an offense other than a petty offense, and is conducted by a magistrate judge. If the magistrate 
judge finds no probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or the defendant 
committed it, the complaint must be dismissed, and the defendant must be discharged. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 5.1(f). 
 45. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 292. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 295. 
 48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1). 
 49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f). 
 50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). 
 51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(f). 
 52. See, e.g., Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 42 (1995) (quoting Advisory Committee’s 
Notes on FED. R. CRIM. P. 11) (noting that the Rule 11 inquiry is meant to determine the 
voluntariness of a plea and protect defendants who do not “realiz[e] that [their] conduct does not 
actually fall within the charge”); id. at 52 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 10 ensures that arraignment shall be conducted in open court, and helps him 
to understand the nature of the charges and his rights); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) 
(requiring that a judicial finding of probable cause must follow a warrantless arrest to impose any 
significant pretrial restraint on liberty); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 412 (1948) (finding 
that the “plain purpose” of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), “that prisoners should 
promptly be taken before committing magistrates,” is to prevent officers from “secret 
interrogation of persons accused of crime” (internal quotations omitted)).   
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B. The Effects of Pretrial Proceedings on Trial 
Pretrial proceedings are crucial in determining the restrictions on 
the accused’s freedoms (through the terms of the accused’s bond or 
remanding the defendant to jail awaiting trial), as well as if and how the 
trial proceeds.  The most extensive and adversarial of these pretrial 
procedures is the preliminary hearing. As discussed above, if a judge 
finds that the government does not have sufficient evidence to support 
a finding of probable cause, she may dismiss the case altogether.53 Even 
if the judge finds that there is enough evidence to proceed to trial, the 
evidence that the government presents at a preliminary hearing can 
cause the court to reassess the bail amount or other terms of pretrial 
release.54 Preliminary hearings are also used to preserve evidence and 
lay the foundation for potential witness impeachment or preserve 
witness testimony for use at trial (if the witness is later unavailable).55 
The preliminary hearing provides several benefits to the defendant. 
First, the defendant is given the opportunity to persuade the judge that 
there is not enough evidence to proceed to trial, cross-examine 
witnesses, and even present his own evidence to the court.56 Second, the 
preliminary hearing can be vital to the defense counsel’s strategy 
determinations, because it allows for an assessment of the strength or 
weakness of the prosecution’s case.57 Although the preliminary 
hearing’s purpose is not to provide discovery to the defendant, that is 
often a byproduct of the proceeding.58 Given the volume of information 
presented at the preliminary hearings, prosecutors use these hearings 
to their strategic advantage, engaging in different tactics like charge-
piling and case-piling, in pursuit of a plea deal.59  Preliminary hearings 
 
 53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(f). 
 54. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (observing that at a preliminary hearing, 
“counsel can also be influential . . . in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters 
as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail”).  
 55. See id. (noting that at preliminary hearing “skilled interrogation of witnesses by an 
experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the 
State’s witnesses at the trial . . . [and] preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness 
who does not appear at the trial”). 
 56. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 292. 
 57. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9 (“[T]rained counsel” at a preliminary hearing can “discover 
the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to 
meet that case at the trial.”). 
 58. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 293. 
 59. Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 
1312–13 (2018). Charge-piling and case-piling refer to the prosecutorial strategy of “piling on 
overlapping, largely duplicative offenses—increasing with each new charge the defendant’s 
potential sentence, his risk of conviction, and the “sticker shock” of intimidation that accompanies 
a hefty charging instrument” so that a defendant may be willing to negotiate to the prosecutor’s 
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are an “integral part” of the plea bargaining process because 
prosecutors can use them to stress upon a defendant the weight of the 
evidence.60 
Aside from the preliminary hearing’s purpose of determining 
whether to proceed or dismiss the case, other pretrial proceedings can 
have a greater impact on an individual’s freedoms and personal life. 
Detention hearings are particularly critical pretrial proceedings. At this 
stage, the court decides whether to detain the defendant or set bail.61 In 
considering whether to set bail, the court evaluates evidence of the 
defendant’s ties to the community, his risk of flight, and the potential 
danger he poses to the public.62 If the court opts to set bail, it must also 
determine what amount, which may be too high for the defendant to 
meet.63 And, as discussed below, pretrial confinement has significant 
weight in a defendant’s decision to plead guilty or proceed to trial.64 
The Court has noted that “pretrial confinement may imperil the 
suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 
relationships,” but that even “pretrial release may be accompanied by 
burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty.”65 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S AMBIGUITY BIRTHS A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
As explored in Part I, pretrial proceedings are an important step in 
the process of a criminal case. But the parameters of a defendant’s 
constitutional rights during this pretrial stage are not clearly defined. 
The Fifth Amendment dictates that a person shall not “be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”66 Despite this 
mandate, there is ambiguity over when this right applies: specifically, 
whether pretrial proceedings qualify as part of a criminal case. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged the uncertainty about what proceedings 
were worthy of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s protections in Chavez 
v. Martinez, but decided that it did not need to explore the parameters 
of “when a criminal case begins.”67 The Court therefore did not 
 
“preferred sentence.” Id. 
 60. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §14.1(e), at 899 (6th ed. 2017).  
 61. Bail, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 387, 390 (2018). 
 62. Id. at 394. 
 63. Initial Hearing / Arraignment, supra note 38. 
 64. Infra, Part V. 
 65. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 67. 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003). 
HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2020  9:10 AM 
154 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 15 
explicitly decide whether pretrial proceedings were covered by the 
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination.68 
After Chavez, the circuits differed in their interpretations of 
“criminal case” in Self-Incrimination Clause analyses. Of the twelve 
circuits, seven have addressed the issue. The circuits are split nearly 
down the middle. Three circuits believe that a criminal case begins at 
trial and that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies only to trial 
proceedings. Four circuits have come to the opposite conclusion, and 
provided liberal interpretations of the timeline of a “criminal case,” 
thus extending the Fifth Amendment protection to pretrial proceedings 
as well. This section explores the Supreme Court decision that gave rise 
to the circuit split, the determinations of each circuit that has 
deliberated on this issue, and the Court’s most recent foray into 
clarifying when a “criminal case” begins, which ultimately reached no 
conclusion on the issue. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Inconclusive Definition of a “Criminal Case” 
In Chavez, the Supreme Court examined whether Ben Chavez, a 
patrol officer in Southern California, had violated Oliverio Martinez’s 
Fifth Amendment rights. Martinez was injured in a shootout with police 
and rushed to the hospital.69 While he was treated for his wounds, 
Martinez verbally expressed a belief he was dying and lamented his 
pain as Chavez interrogated him about the events of the shootout.70 
Chavez persisted with the interrogation despite Martinez’s statement 
that he would not tell Chavez anything until he was treated.71 At no 
point were Miranda warnings issued.72 The interrogation concluded 
when Martinez admitted that he used heroin, and had taken an officer’s 
gun during the incident. 73 
Martinez was never charged with a crime, and his answers never 
used against him in a criminal proceeding.74 But Martinez initiated 
proceedings of his own. He filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit on the premise 
that Chavez’s actions violated Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right not 
to be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”75 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 767. 
 70. Id. at 769. 
 71. Id. at 764. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 764–65.  
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The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that Chavez’s coercive questioning 
was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, regardless of the fact that the 
statements were not used in a single criminal proceeding.76 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, although 
the Court fractured. Justice Thomas delivered the judgment of the 
Court, and explained that because criminal charges were never brought 
against Martinez, there was no Fifth Amendment violation.77 Justices 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter agreed with this outcome.78 In 
his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas specifically noted that, for 
purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, a “criminal case” requires 
“at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings.”79 
Because there was no initiation of a criminal case against Martinez, 
Justice Thomas asserted that there was no need to define “the precise 
moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences;” rather, it was enough to 
limit this case to holding that police questioning “does not constitute a 
‘case.’”80 
Justice Thomas further noted that a Self-Incrimination Clause 
violation does not occur until the compelled statements are used in a 
criminal case.81 He maintained that “mere coercion does not violate the 
text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled 
statements in a criminal case against the witness.”82 In doing so, Justice 
Thomas conceded that Supreme Court precedent mandates that the 
Fifth Amendment allows a person to not answer questions in “any 
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the 
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”83 
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas still concluded that a violation of the right 
 
 76. Id. at 765. 
 77. Id. at 766. 
 78. Id. at 763. In addition to Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion, Justice Souter delivered a 
separate opinion, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined as to Part II. Id. 
at 777 (Souter, J., concurring). Part II concluded that the issue of whether Martinez may pursue 
a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand. See id. 
at 779–80 (Souter, J., concurring).   
 79. Id. at 766. This part of the opinion, discussing what constitutes a “criminal case,” was 
joined only by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia. 
 80. Id. at 767. 
 81. Id. In making this assertion, Justice Thomas also quoted United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990), which observed, “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although 
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a 
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”  
 82. Id. at 769.  
 83. Id. at 770 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)). 
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against self-incrimination occurs only if the person is compelled as a 
witness against himself in a criminal case.84 
Justices Souter and Breyer, concurring in the judgment, reasoned 
that the Fifth Amendment’s text “focuses on courtroom use of a 
criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony.”85 In 
contrast, Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Ginsburg stated that the Self-
Incrimination Clause is violated the moment a confession is compelled, 
regardless of whether or not it is used in any proceedings, and that the 
Fifth Amendment applied to pretrial proceedings.86 
Beyond stating that a criminal case requires at least the initiation 
of criminal proceedings, Justice Thomas provided no guidelines as to 
what exactly commences a “criminal case.” Therefore, the Court did 
not provide a singular, definitive moment that triggers the Fifth 
Amendment protections. This move may have been intentional: some 
scholars posit that the Court will sometimes issue a “way station” 
opinion in the hopes of sparking conversation among the circuit 
courts.87 The Court will then address the issue later, invoking the 
circuits’ opinions as possible grounds for its decision.88 Whether or not 
the plurality opinion in Chavez was intended to be ambiguous and 
spark debate among the federal circuits, that has certainly been the 
result. Seven circuits have since debated Justice Thomas’s plurality 
opinion, with no unifying consensus as to the definition of a “criminal 
case” or the parameters of the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
B. The Circuit Split Over What Qualifies as a “Criminal Case” 
In the nearly two decades since Chavez, the circuits have been left 
to determine the limits of the Fifth Amendment in the pretrial context. 
In doing so, they are guided only by Justice Thomas’s finding that a 
criminal case begins at the initiation of criminal proceedings. However, 
because the Court did not explicate if the commencement of criminal 
proceedings includes pretrial proceedings, the circuits are split over 
whether the right against self-incrimination is strictly a “trial right” or 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 86. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 87. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 1183, 1197 (2017) (“As justification for overturning precedent, the Court may invoke 
tensions in the doctrine and countervailing lines of precedent, even though it obviously 
contributed to those tensions.”).  
 88. See id. at 1201–02 (noting that this action is a way that “the Court invokes changes that 
it played a part in causing without candidly admitting as much.”). 
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if the Fifth Amendment also permits the use of coerced and compelled 
statements in pretrial criminal proceedings. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits have held that the Fifth Amendment is only a trial right.89 The 
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that certain 
pretrial uses of compelled statements are a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.90 For reasons discussed below, this Note asserts that the 
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are correct that the Fifth 
Amendment protections should apply to pretrial proceedings, and that 
the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the protection is particularly strong. 
On one side of the split, the Third,91 Fourth,92 and Fifth93 circuits 
adopt a narrow interpretation of “criminal case,” holding that the Self-
Incrimination Clause does not apply to pretrial proceedings. In doing 
so, the circuits devoted little time or space to an analysis of Chavez or 
the definition of “criminal case.”94 
The Third Circuit concluded that because Chavez left open the 
question of when a criminal case commenced, “it is the use of coerced 
statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an indictment, 
that violates the Constitution.”95 It reached this conclusion despite 
acknowledging that a compelled statement used to file criminal charges 
was in fact used in “a criminal case in one sense.”96 Indeed, the coerced 
statement was used to establish probable cause and obtain a warrant 
for the suspect’s arrest.97 And, in a case decided two years after Chavez, 
 
 89. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 
285 (5th Cir. 2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 90. See Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment precluded a coerced statement from admission in probable cause hearings); Best v. 
City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
protection applied at suppression hearings); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at probable cause hearings); Higazy v. 
Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that that Self-Incrimination Clause applied 
to initial appearances and bail hearings”); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1027 
(7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the Fifth Amendment protection was applicable at bail hearings, 
arraignments, and probable cause hearings).  
 91. Renda, 347 F.3d at 557–59. The Third Circuit provided the most analysis of the three 
circuits that determined that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies to trial only, devoting 585 
words to an analysis of Chavez and comparing it to the case at hand.  
 92. Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513–14. The Fourth Circuit devoted 518 words to a discussion of 
Chavez and its application to the case.  
 93. Murray, 405 F.3d at 285. The Fifth Circuit confined its holding that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination can “be violated only at trial,” to a single 31-word sentence, 
without exploring the nuances of Chavez or defining “criminal case.”  
 94. See supra notes 91, 92, 93 (providing the word counts of each circuit’s Chavez analysis). 
 95. Renda, 347 F.3d at 559. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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the Fifth Circuit merely stated the “privilege against self-incrimination 
is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at trial, even 
though pretrial conduct by law enforcement officials may ultimately 
impair that right.”98 It engaged in no discussion of when a “criminal 
case” begins, and merely cited to the Chavez plurality in its assertion 
that the Fifth Amendment protections only cover use of compelled 
statements at trial.99 
While the Third and Fifth Circuits devoted little space and analysis 
to defining a criminal case, the Fourth Circuit performed a more in-
depth parsing of the Chavez plurality opinion.100 It also relied on Justice 
Souter’s concurrence in determining that the Supreme Court meant 
that the Fifth Amendment is only violated when a statement is used at 
trial.101 The circuit interpreted the plurality’s opinion in Chavez as 
finding that no constitutional violation had occurred because the 
compelled testimony was never admitted in court.102 In its analysis, the 
Fourth Circuit did not mention that in the Supreme Court’s dismissal 
of Chavez’s case, the Court observed that the compelled statements at 
issue were not used in any proceedings, since no charges were ever 
filed.103 
The Fourth Circuit also quoted Justices Souter and Breyer’s 
concurrence in Chavez, which said that “the text of the Fifth 
Amendment (applied here under the doctrine of Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporation) focuses on courtroom use of a criminal 
defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony, and the core of 
the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of 
such evidence.”104 Because it reached this conclusion, the Fourth 
Circuit felt it was bound by prior circuit precedent that dictated that it 
is only “the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not 
in obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.”105 
The four circuits that have defined “criminal case” more broadly, 
however, have not applied the Fifth Amendment to every pretrial 
proceeding. Rather, the circuits have extended the right on a case-by-
 
 98. Murray, 405 F.3d at 285. 
 99. Id. n.12. 
 100. Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2005); see supra notes 91, 92, 93 
(comparing the word counts of each circuit’s Self-Incrimination Clause and Chavez analyses). 
 101. Id. at 513. 
 102. Id. at 513. 
 103. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777 (2003). 
 104. Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513 (quoting Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770). 
 105. Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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case basis to the specific pretrial proceeding at issue in each case. The 
Second Circuit has held that the right against self-incrimination applies 
to an initial appearance at which bail is set.106 The Seventh Circuit first 
noted that a criminal case includes bail hearings, arraignment hearings, 
and probable cause hearings under the Fifth Amendment,107 later 
adding suppression hearings to the circuit’s definition of a criminal 
case.108 And the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal case, for the purposes 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, includes the filing of formal charges 
against the declarant, proceedings to determine judicially that the 
prosecution may continue, and proceedings that determine pretrial 
custody status.109 The most recent circuit to adopt a more expansive 
understanding of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit, held that 
“criminal case” includes probable cause hearings.110 
Each circuit that has held that the Fifth Amendment applies to 
pretrial proceedings has provided a significant and thorough analysis 
of the Chavez opinion, and of what constitutes the initiation of a 
“criminal case.”111 This Note posits that circuits should adopt the Tenth 
Circuit’s extensive Fifth Amendment analysis in Vogt v. City of Hays.112 
The Tenth Circuit in Vogt examined the Amendment’s purpose, 
Supreme Court precedent on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, the 
Framers’ intent, and the text of the amendment. In addition to 
endorsing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis determining that “criminal case” 
covers pretrial proceedings, this Note offers a public policy rationale 
for extending the right to pretrial proceedings, which aligns with the 
Court’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment precedents. 
After the Tenth Circuit held in Vogt v. City of Hays that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to pretrial proceedings, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in that case to clarify what a “criminal case” is for the 
Self-Incrimination Clause. Three months after oral argument, the Court 
 
 106. Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 107. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–1027 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 108. Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 109. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 110. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, City of Hays v. 
Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017). 
 111. The Second Circuit’s opinion included 990 words discussing Chavez and what constitutes 
a criminal case. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 171–73. The Seventh Circuit explored the issue in 1,543 words 
in its first case on the issue. Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1023–27. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue 
in 1,552 words. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 922–25. The Tenth Circuit spent the most time on the issue, 
evaluating the Chavez decision and the meaning of a criminal case in 3,835 words. Vogt, 844 F.3d 
at 1239–46. 
 112. 844 F.3d 1235 (2017). 
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dismissed the case as improvidently granted.113 There is speculation 
that the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted because it 
was fraught with procedural issues.114 Supreme Court commentators 
noted that the three-month lag between oral arguments and the case’s 
dismissal suggest that the Court’s interest was piqued.115 Moreover, it 
has been suggested that the Court will be looking for a “clean” cert 
petition on this issue to readdress the case.116 
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
By dismissing Vogt as improvidently granted, the Supreme Court 
left the Tenth Circuit’s holding untouched, offering no opinion on the 
circuit’s analysis or holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies 
to pretrial proceedings. This Note, however, proposes that the Tenth 
Circuit’s in-depth analysis of the Self-Incrimination Clause should be 
adopted by the Court and other circuits. This section provides an 
overview of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the Court’s precedent 
regarding the application of the Self-Incrimination Clause within the 
pretrial context. It will also describe the opinion’s textual analysis of 
the Fifth Amendment. This section concludes with a discussion of the 
Tenth Circuit’s evaluation of the Fifth Amendment’s history, which 
suggests that the Self-Incrimination Clause is more than a “trial right.” 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Examination of Supreme Court Precedent 
Concerning the Self-Incrimination Clause 
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis examined both Supreme Court 
precedent on the parameters of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the 
Fifth Amendment more broadly. As the Tenth Circuit noted, the Court 
has long allowed the Fifth Amendment to be invoked by witnesses 
during grand jury proceedings.117 In the seminal case extolling a 
 
 113. Rory Little, Opinion analysis: A DIG in Vogt, SCOTUSBLOG (May 29th, 2018 4:17 pm), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/opinion-analysis-a-dig-in-vogt/.  
 114. Id. At oral argument, the Justices expressed concerns about non-record information, 
which allegedly suggested that some of the plaintiff’s factual allegations were questionable. The 
Justices openly sparred about whether the non-record information should be considered. Further, 
the City of Kansas noted that the statements at issue “were viewed as ‘compelled’ only by 
application of a 1967 employment-law decision . . . that has long been controversial,” and asked 
the Court to reconsider the doctrine (even though that was not mentioned in the cert petition).  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892), overruled in part by Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). This holding was later limited by Kastigar, which found 
that the government can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth 
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witness’s right to the Fifth Amendment privilege, Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he case before the grand 
jury was . . . a criminal case,” and because of this, the witness could 
invoke the privilege to remain silent.118 The Court’s analysis was 
informed by the text of the Fifth Amendment, particularly in light of 
the text of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment specifically 
employs the term “criminal prosecution” in describing its limits, and 
the Court stated that a “criminal prosecution” is much narrower than 
the term “criminal case,” which is employed by the Fifth 
Amendment.119 The Court used this analysis to bolster its conclusion 
that grand jury proceedings are part of a criminal case for the purposes 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause.120 
In contrast to Counselman, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez later suggested that the right against self-
incrimination is limited to trial.121 But this suggestion was made in dicta; 
the issue in Verdugo-Urquidez was the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Court only analyzed the Fifth Amendment in an 
effort to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope.122 Thus, the Court’s 
reasoning regarding the Self-Incrimination Clause does not carry 
precedential weight because the Fifth Amendment was not an issue in 
the case. 
The Court has since refused to limit the Fifth Amendment by 
finding that the right expires when the trial concludes following the 
judge or jury’s determination of guilt or innocence.123 Rather, the Court 
has held that the protection against self-incrimination applies to the 
sentencing phase of a criminal trial.124 In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court rejected the argument that sentencing proceedings are not part 
of a “criminal case,” because such a view is contrary to law and common 
sense.125 In Chavez, the Court had another opportunity to define the 
Fifth Amendment as only a trial right, but notably refused to do so.126 
 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination if the government promises 
immunity to the witness. 
 118. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562. 
 119. Id. at 563. 
 120. Id. 
 121. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 124. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003). 
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B.  The Tenth Circuit’s Textual Analysis of the Fifth Amendment 
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
Fifth Amendment in the seminal Self-Incrimination Clause case, 
Counselman. In particular, the Tenth Circuit echoed the Court’s 
determination that the language “criminal case” is much broader than 
the Sixth Amendment’s use of “criminal prosecution.”127 In addition to 
noting that the phrase “criminal case” appears to encompass the 
proceedings of a “criminal prosecution,” the Tenth Circuit examined 
the term’s plain meaning at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s 
ratification.128 The Tenth Circuit cited to four dictionaries from the 
Founding era, including the dictionary that the Supreme Court often 
cites as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.129 These 
definitions ultimately led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the 
Founders understood that “case” was not limited to a trial. 130 This 
understanding seems particularly strong given that the Framers could 
have restricted the right to “trial.”131 The Framers specifically used 
“trial” in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments,132 and also used the 
phrase “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth Amendment.133 The Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that the use of different phrases in these adjacent 
amendments was a deliberate choice of the Framers, supporting the 
view that the Fifth Amendment is not simply at trial right. 134 
The Tenth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Blyew v. 
United States to further support its textual analysis.135 In Blyew, the 
Court defined “case” in Article III broadly, declaring that “[t]he words 
‘case’ and ‘cause’ are constantly used as synonyms in statutes and 
judicial decisions, each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or 
action.”136 The Tenth Circuit found that this centuries-old Supreme 
Court definition of “case,” particularly as a “proceeding in court,” 
meant that the Fifth Amendment’s use of “criminal case” is not limited 
to trial.137 
 
 127. Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1242. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1242–43. 
 130. Id. at 1243. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 80 U.S. 581, 584 (1871). Justice Thomas also cited to this opinion in his analysis of 
“criminal case” during his plurality opinion in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003). 
 136. Id. at 595. 
 137. Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1243. 
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C.  The Tenth Circuit’s Examination of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Legislative History 
The Tenth Circuit also engaged in a thread of analysis that no other 
circuit (on either side of the split) has explored: an extensive evaluation 
of the history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Fifth 
Amendment.138 The Tenth Circuit first noted that when James Madison 
drafted the Amendment, he did not confine the Self-Incrimination 
Clause to “criminal case[s],” but broadly wrote the Clause as “nor shall 
be compelled to be a witness against himself,” which could be 
interpreted as extending to civil cases as well.139 In subsequent floor 
debates, a Representative suggested that the Fifth Amendment should 
be limited to criminal cases, in an attempt to distinguish civil and 
criminal liability.140 Historical sources from this time show that the right 
against self-incrimination was understood to arise not at criminal trial, 
but in pretrial proceedings.141 
The Tenth Circuit also explained that limiting the Fifth Amendment 
to a defendant’s trial would have been superfluous, because at this time, 
criminal defendants were unable to testify at their own trial.142 
Therefore, the rational understanding of the right is that it was meant 
for non-trial proceedings.143 In addition, the Tenth Circuit noted that 
the Sixth Amendment also provides rights to the defendant alone 
(unlike the Fifth Amendment, which can be invoked by any witness).144 
The deliberate placement of the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment illustrates that it was not intended to be restricted to trial; 
indeed, it was not even intended to be restricted even to defendants.145 
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FAVORS APPLYING THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis, while thorough and appropriate, is not 
exhaustive. In addition to endorsing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and 
holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause extends to pretrial 
proceedings, this Note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
precedent that also promotes the application of this protection to 
 
 138. Id. at 1244–46. 
 139. Id. at 1244. 
 140. Id. at 1244–45. 
 141. Id. at 1245. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1244. 
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pretrial proceedings. This section explores the Court’s application of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause generally and how pretrial proceedings 
align with this precedent. It also examines Court precedent defining 
pretrial proceedings as part of a “criminal case” within the context of 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and other contexts. Identifying 
these proceedings as part of a “criminal case” is consistent with both 
the text of the Fifth Amendment, and Justice Thomas’s plurality 
opinion in Chavez. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Broad Application of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause 
The Supreme Court has consistently articulated that the “basic 
function” of the Fifth Amendment is to “protect innocent men . . . who 
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.”146 The 
Court has also observed that the Fifth Amendment’s “sole concern is 
to afford protection against being forced to give testimony leading to 
the infliction of [criminal] penalties.”147 Additionally, the Court has 
asserted that the Self-Incrimination Clause in particular “reflects a 
complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an 
important advance in the development of our liberty.”148 In keeping this 
critical concern in mind, the Court has sworn to “zealous[ly] . . . 
safeguard the values which underlie the [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege.”149 
The Court has upheld this pledge by holding that the right against 
self-incrimination is not limited to criminal defendants. Witnesses who 
reasonably believe that danger or penalty may result from their 
answers are able to invoke the Fifth Amendment.150 Even an innocent 
witness who provides truthful answers may invoke this privilege.151 The 
right against self-incrimination is not limited to information that would 
lead to a criminal conviction. This right also extends to evidence that 
could provide a link to an evidence chain needed to support the case 
for prosecuting a criminal.152 What qualifies as acting as a “witness” 
 
 146. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957). 
 147. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). 
 148. Id. at 444–45. 
 149. Id. at 445. 
 150. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) 
 151. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 421–22.  
 152. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001). 
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against oneself covers not only compelled oral testimony, but also 
compelled production of papers and belongings.153 
The Supreme Court’s view of Miranda also supports a broad 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated that 
Miranda’s exclusionary rule “sweeps more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself” in order to support the protections provided by the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.154 Finally, the Court has noted that the Fifth 
Amendment “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects 
against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be 
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that 
might be so used.”155 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Declaring Preliminary Hearings as Part 
of a Criminal Case 
Although Justice Thomas deferred from providing a definitive 
starting point of a criminal case, he clearly articulated the principle that 
a case begins, at the very least, at the “initiation of legal proceedings.”156 
In the context of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
provided definitions of what qualifies as a legal proceeding and which 
pretrial hearings are part of a “criminal prosecution”; these pretrial 
hearings trigger the Amendment’s right to counsel.157 The Tenth Circuit 
determined that the term “criminal case” is broader than the Sixth 
Amendment’s use of “criminal prosecution.”158 Because “criminal 
case” encompasses the multiple stages of a criminal prosecution, the 
Fifth Amendment should be applied to each proceeding that is covered 
by the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. Furthermore, the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Impeachment Clause share a similar purpose. The Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel attaches to adversarial pretrial proceedings in which 
the accused may be prejudiced or face loss of liberty.159 This purpose is 
 
 153. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974). 
 154. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985). 
 155. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 156. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003). 
 157. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (right to counsel attaches at a 
defendant’s “initial appearance”); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (right to counsel 
attaches at post-arraignment interrogation because adversarial proceedings had begun); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (right to counsel attaches at pretrial lineup). 
 158. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 159. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213, 217 (2008) (holding that the right to 
counsel attaches at “criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where . . . his 
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equally applicable to the Self-Impeachment Clause: the privilege can 
be invoked in any proceeding, civil or criminal, where a defendant’s 
disclosures could be used against him in a criminal prosecution (and 
thus lead to a loss of his liberty).160 The pretrial proceedings that trigger 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be covered by the Fifth 
Amendment because both protect the individual in a case that may 
result in a loss of liberty.161 
In its analysis of whether a proceeding requires the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel, the Court first evaluates whether the 
proceeding is a “critical stage” of prosecution that requires the aid of 
an attorney.162 In making determinations about what qualifies as a 
“critical stage,” the Court has used language similar to that in Justice 
Thomas’s plurality opinion in Chavez. Specifically, the Court has 
determined that a criminal trial commences at “‘the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.’”163 The rationale is simple: at this point, the government 
has committed itself to prosecution, and the accused is in the midst of 
complex procedural and substantive criminal law.164 A commitment to 
prosecution is self-evidently adversarial. 
In guaranteeing a defendant’s right to counsel at an initial 
appearance (whether on a formal complaint or an arraignment on 
indictment), the Court reaffirmed precedent that “by the time a 
defendant is brought before a judicial officer,” an adversarial 
relationship has begun.165 The fact that a defendant may then have 
restrictions imposed on his freedoms only furthers the inference that 
 
liberty is subject to restriction” and further holding that the right attaches at a preliminary hearing 
because “substantial prejudice. . . inheres”). 
 160. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444–45. 
 161. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (finding that the right to counsel 
attaches to criminal cases which may result in the accused’s loss of liberty); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 
444–45 (noting that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination “reflects a 
complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the 
development of our liberty”). The right to counsel has also been considered critical to ensuring 
the right to a fair trial. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968). 
 162. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). The Court noted that the determination 
whether the hearing is a “critical stage” that requires counsel depends on an analysis “whether 
potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the 
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
227 (1967)). 
 163. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
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these proceedings are adversarial in nature.166 The right to counsel 
applies at a pre-indictment preliminary hearing, where the court 
determines if there is sufficient evidence to warrant presenting a case 
to the grand jury; if there is, the court will also set bail if required. 167 
This is particularly true because these hearings present an opportunity 
for a lawyer to examine and cross-examine witnesses, which may 
expose fatal flaws in the State’s case and cause the magistrate to refuse 
to set bail.168 The Court repeatedly recognized that these arraignment 
proceedings are so critical that “[w]hat happens there may affect the 
whole trial.”169 The Court has further treated the bail hearings as a 
“critical stage of the State’s criminal process at which the accused is as 
much entitled to such aid (of counsel) . . . as at the trial itself.”170 
C.  Additional Doctrine Identifying Pretrial Proceedings as Part of a 
Criminal Case 
Outside the context of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, the 
Court has noted several additional proceedings that qualify as the 
initiation of a criminal prosecution. This includes probable cause 
hearings (for the purpose of § 1983 claims).171 The Court held in Burns 
v. Reed that “appearing at a probable-cause hearing is ‘intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . .’ and with 
the initiation and conduct of a prosecution.”172 Arrest warrants173 and 
grand jury proceedings174 are two additional ways that the government 
can initiate the legal process of a criminal trial. Furthermore, Congress 
has identified pretrial processes as part of “legal proceedings,” to use 
Justice Thomas’s words, in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.175 
While some of the Rules cover purely technical aspects of federal 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 8. 
 168. Id. at 9. 
 169. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961); see also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 
60, (1963) (finding that the preliminary hearing as a critical stage of trial, because the petitioner 
entered a plea before the magistrate judge, without assistance of counsel). 
 170. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9–10 (emphasis added). 
 171. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1991). 
 172. Id. at 492 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). 
 173. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 n.6 (2017). 
 174. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (“There is every reason to believe that 
our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor. 
The basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal 
proceedings against persons believed to have committed crimes.” (emphasis added)). 
 175. Jordan Gross, An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is Worth More Than a Pound of Post-
Conviction Cure: Untethering Federal Pretrial Criminal Procedure From Due Process Standards 
of Review, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 317, 324 (2013). 
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criminal procedure, such as recording requirements for preliminary 
hearings, many Rules address procedures with substantive and 
constitutional dimensions.176 The scope of the Rules govern “all 
criminal proceedings,”177 which includes Title II, the section covering 
“Preliminary Proceedings.”178 The Rules also encompass grand jury 
proceedings,179 indictments,180 arraignments,181 pleas,182 and pleadings 
and pretrial hearings.183 An understanding of these pretrial proceedings 
as worthy of the Fifth Amendment’s protections aligns with Justice 
Thomas’s statement that a case begins at the initiation of legal 
proceedings.  It also supports Supreme Court precedent and interest in 
ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected at all stages of a 
criminal case. 
V.  POLICY RATIONALE FOR APPLYING THE SELF-INCRIMINATION 
CLAUSE TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
There are significant policy reasons that bolster the view that all 
who have been formally accused of a crime should be able to invoke 
this right. This section of the Note advocates extending the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections to preliminary proceedings to address 
underlying public policy concerns, and also explores opponents’ beliefs 
that such an extension would be difficult for the justice system to 
handle. 
A. Policy Arguments for a Broad Understanding of the Self-
Incrimination Clause 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Chavez noted that extending 
the bare guarantees of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause may be warranted if it is needed to protect the core of the right 
against contemporary society’s pressures.184 The invasive pressures of 
contemporary society is evidenced by the steadily increasing 
percentage of guilty pleas. Our criminal justice system has largely 
 
 176. Id. at 320–21. 
 177. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1. 
 178. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3–5.1. These sections as encompassed in Title II cover criminal 
complaints, arrest warrants, the initial appearance and preliminary hearings. 
 179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. 
 180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7. 
 181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10. 
 182. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. 
 184. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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foregone trials in favor of plea deals. In 2018, 97.4% of federal offenders 
pled guilty, which is a half percent increase from the 96.9% guilty plea 
rate in 2013.185 In contrast, only 83% of federal cases resolved in 1979 
were the result of guilty pleas.186 This is not solely a federal issue; 94% 
of state criminal convictions resulted in guilty pleas.187 
This trend may be a consequence of how pretrial proceedings 
unfold. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the most critical 
period of the proceedings against these defendants . . . [is] from the time 
of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial.”188 The use of 
coerced statements during this critical stage can shape the outcome of 
the case and whether a defendant chooses to plead or proceed to trial. 
The role that pretrial proceedings—particularly bail hearings—can 
play in a defendant’s decision to plead cannot be overstated. The 
process costs of pretrial detention and bail bonds are two critical factors 
in most misdemeanor defendants’ decision to plead guilty rather than 
face trial.189 It can be particularly compelling to plead guilty when a 
defendant considers that the length of the pretrial detention can equal 
or even exceed the punishment that may be imposed after trial.190 An 
offer to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of time already served 
is one that many defendants feel is too good to refuse.191 Furthermore, 
pretrial detention can hamper a defendant’s ability to prepare for his 
trial: for instance, it is more difficult for detained defendants to meet 
with their attorneys.192 This further incentivizes quick plea bargains in 
misdemeanors, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at 
an eventual trial.193 
 
 185. See Fiscal Year 2018 Overview, supra note 27; see also Dep’t of Justice Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 27. 
 186. Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., Univ. of Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics Online tbl.5.22.2010 (Kathleen Maguire ed.), http://www.albany.edu/source 
book/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
 187. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 
(2010) (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.”). 
 188. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
 189. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives 
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 951–55 (1983). 
 190. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2492 (2004). 
 191. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2146 (1998). 
 192. Bibas, supra note 190190, at 2492. 
 193. See id. In these instances, “the shadow of pretrial detention looms much larger over these 
small cases than does the shadow of trial.” 
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Even an acquittal at trial cannot recover the toll of days spent in jail 
during pretrial detention.194 The desire of defendants for immediate 
release from jail gives prosecutors more leverage to obtain a plea from 
detained defendants than from those free on bail.195 In this vein, 
prosecutors sometimes engage in a practice known as overcharging, or 
alternatively as “charge-piling,” in which prosecutors will charge the 
defendant with a more serious crime, or multiple crimes, thereby 
exposing the accused to a higher sentence.196 The “charge bargain” is 
then an agreement to replace a higher charge with a lower one in 
exchange for a guilty plea; it often results in prosecutors obtaining the 
sentence that they actually prefer in the most efficient means 
possible.197 In some instances, a defendant who is guilty of only one of 
the charges may have difficulty defending successfully against both and 
decide to plead.198 Pretrial processes are crucial to determining when a 
prosecutor may be overreaching (either factually or legally) in the 
charges.199 
As Justice Ginsburg noted during her questioning at oral argument 
in Vogt v. City of Hays, it seems contrary to common sense that evidence 
which would be inadmissible at trial could be introduced at a probable 
cause hearing to determine if there is enough evidence to go to trial.200 
 
 194. Id. at 2493. 
 195. Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. 
REV. 439, 444 (1971). 
 196. Crespo, supra note 59, at 1313–14. The author exemplifies “charge-piling” using a 
defendant who omits armed robbery, “[a]nd yet, in practice, a prosecutor could and routinely 
would commence a prosecution against such a defendant by piling on a host of additional charges, 
including (to list just some examples) aggravated assault, theft, threats, possession of a weapon, 
and using a firearm during a crime of violence.” Id. at 1314.  
 197. Id. at 1311–12. This Note is not suggesting that prosecutors try to convict innocent 
persons of crimes they did not commit. Rather, scholars have concluded that “various pressures 
on prosecutors . . . can cause them to act in ways that subvert justice . . . [often] unintentionally.” 
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 295 (observing that prosecutors can suffer from “tunnel vision” that 
prevents them from seeing the flaws in their case); Cf. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 
420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]o coerce cooperation . . . prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, 
enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are 
appropriate.”). 
 198. Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1143 (2005).  
 199. Crespo, supra note 59, at 1332; see also Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: 
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
851, 865 (1995) (observing that prosecutors sometimes exploit the gap “between the quantity and 
quality of evidence necessary to support a legitimate charge and the quantity and quality of 
evidence needed to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense”). 
 200. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, City of Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (mem.) (2017) 
(No. 16–1495). 
HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2020  9:10 AM 
2020] PRETRIAL AND ERROR 171 
The same is true of arraignments, bail hearings, or indictments. The case 
of Teresa Sornberger is a perfect illustration of the use of such 
statements and their impact. Teresa Sornberger’s coerced confession, 
which would have been inadmissible at the trial stage, was used to find 
probable cause for a trial and to set her bail at an amount that she could 
not meet.201 
Teresa Sornberger’s circumstances are hardly unique; five out of six 
defendants remain in jail awaiting trial because they cannot afford bail 
amounts.202 In 2017, only 40 percent of all federal defendants were 
released on bail.203 Empirical studies show that many more defendants 
are imprisoned before trial than are convicted and imprisoned 
following trial.204 Additional empirical data shows that if all defendants 
had the economic capability to make bail, fewer than 6.8% of 
defendants would plead guilty to misdemeanors.205 Eliminating the use 
of statements that would be considered inadmissible at trial could 
alleviate the burden on defendants and chip away at the system of mass 
incarceration. 
B. Counter-Arguments: In Favor of Limiting the Fifth Amendment to 
Trial 
Advocates for limiting the Self-Incrimination Clause to a trial right 
have expressed several concerns about understanding the parameters 
of a “criminal case” to include pretrial proceedings. They believe that 
the text and the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause show that it 
applies only to trial proceedings.  Advocates of this view, including the 
Department of Justice, have also raised concerns that extending the 
right would fundamentally alter the nature of pretrial proceedings and 
lead to inefficiency among the courts. 
 
 201. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 202. Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State 
Courts, Bureau Just. Stat. 1 (Nov. 2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf. See 
also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial 
Justice (June 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601.html 
(noting that many pretrial detainees have been “charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to 
public drug use,” and that they are detained “because they simply cannot afford to post the bail 
required—very often, just a few hundred dollars—to return home until their day in court 
arrives”). 
 203. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, Pretrial 
Services - Judicial Business 2017, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/pretrial-services-
judicial-business-2017 (last visited on Mar. 3, 2020). This percentage decreases to 28% when 
immigration cases are included in the analysis. 
 204. Alschuler, supra note 189, at 953. 
 205. Lynch, supra note 191, at 2146. 
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The Solicitor General has suggested that a Self-Incrimination 
Clause violation requires that the statement be incriminating and 
would establish a defendant’s criminal responsibility.206 The 
government also has argued that preliminary proceedings do not 
determine criminal guilt or innocence.207 The government’s argument 
overlooks the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment: that the privilege 
can be invoked in any criminal case, and that Justice Thomas has 
explained that the criminal case begins with the initiation of adverse 
legal proceedings. A preliminary or bail hearing, is, by its nature, 
adversarial. If these hearings were not adversarial, the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel would not apply. Nor does the 
government’s argument address the claim that the Founders could have 
limited the Fifth Amendment by specifically using “trial,” rather than 
“case.” 
An understanding that the Self-Incrimination Clause precludes 
compelled statements against interest in pretrial proceedings 
necessarily means that the court would have to resolve admissibility 
issues either before or during pretrial proceedings. Admissibility is not 
always a simple determination to make because it involves “careful 
scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.”208 Requiring that 
suppression issues be resolved in preliminary proceedings may delay 
the proceedings. 209 This may lead to logistical issues because many 
pretrial proceedings are supposed to be completed soon after charges 
are filed.210 There is a concern that these deadlines would be difficult to 
meet, and resolution of the ultimate issues delayed, if courts also need 
to determine the admissibility of challenged evidence.211 
There is no doubt that some of these concerns are valid. But as 
Justice Sotomayor noted during the Vogt v. City of Hays oral arguments, 
of the four circuits which have held that the Fifth Amendment applies 
 
 206. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, City of          
Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495). 
 207. Id. at 11.  
 208. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
 209. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, City of Hays 
v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495). 
 210. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(c) (requiring that the preliminary hearing take place within 21 
days of the initial appearance if the defendant is not in custody, and within 14 days after the initial 
appearance if the defendant is in custody); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (requiring that initial 
appearances occur “without unnecessary delay”); Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 286 (noting 
that Gerstein hearings must be held within 48 hours of arrest).  
 211. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30, City of Hays 
v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495). 
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to pretrial proceedings, none have been “gummed up” by this shift.212 
This may be because not every defendant will have a statement that 
they wish to contest as a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. It 
may also be that the analysis is often less difficult or cumbersome than 
proponents of limiting this privilege to trial suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
Any observer of the criminal justice system knows that the case 
does not begin when the judge enters the courtroom on the first day of 
trial. The nature of our system means that the judge has already made 
several important decisions that affect trial proceedings and strategy, 
and counsel on both sides have advocated different aspects of their case 
in front of the judge. While the Chavez decision may have failed to 
specify a specific moment when a “criminal case” begins, Justice 
Thomas’s explanation alone that it “requires the initiation of legal 
proceedings,” is enough to demand that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
should cover all pretrial proceedings. This understanding is only 
bolstered in consideration of the Tenth Circuit’s extensive analysis, as 
well as the Court’s understanding of pretrial processes as legal 
proceedings, and the policy rationales for extending the right to the 
period before opening statements. 
The balance of values between efficiency and the protection of the 
rights of the accused has always been a difficult one. But the capacity 
for pretrial proceedings to impair or severely impact a person’s liberties 
shows that in this critical stage before trial, it makes little sense to 
weaponize statements that would be inadmissible at trial. Using a 
person’s statements against his interest and compelling him to be a 
witness against himself in a way that results in the loss of liberty or 
hampers the ensuing trial is exactly what the Self-Incrimination Clause 
is meant to prevent. 
 
 
 212. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, City of Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (mem.) (2017) 
(No. 16–1495). 
